CSR in the aftermath of the financial crisis by Lauesen, Linne Marie
	   1	  
CSR	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
Linne	  Marie	  Lauesen,	  PhD-­‐stipendiate,	  Copenhagen	  Business	  School,	  Denmark	  
ABSTRACT	  
Purpose	   –	   The	  purpose	  of	   the	  paper	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   literature	  of	   CSR	  before	   and	   in	   the	   aftermath	  of	   the	  
financial	   crisis	   in	  2008.	  The	  aim	  of	   the	   research	  question	   is	   to	  map	  out	   the	   consequences	  upon	  CSR	  derived	  
from	  the	  crisis	  and	  to	  derive	  new	  principles	  of	  future	  CSR	  models	  to	  come	  consistent	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	  
the	   financial	   crisis,	   and	   to	   suggest	   new	   research	   as	   well	   as	   policy-­‐making	   possibilities	   to	   highlight	   the	  
importance	  and	  necessary	  survival	  of	  CSR	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  sustainable	  and	  financial	  progress.	  	  
Design/methodology/approach	  –	  The	  paper	  uses	  a	  literature	  review	  of	  CSR	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
2008	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  academic	  papers	  published	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journals.	  
Findings	  –	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  paper	  reveal	  that	  post-­‐crisis	  CSR-­‐models	  do	  not	  articulate	  anything	  that	  has	  not	  
been	  mentioned	  before;	  however	  they	  do	  strengthen	  former	  values	  of	  CSR,	  but	  still	  lacks	  an	  overall	  formula	  of	  
how	  the	  financial	  sector	  can	  adopt	  CSR	  in	  the	  core	  of	  their	  businesses	  and	  transparently	  display	  their	  products	  
and	  the	  risk	  adhering	  to	  them.	  The	  paper	  proposes	  a	  new	  Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principle	  that	  may	  guide	  new	  CSR-­‐models	  to	  
accomplish	  this	  deficit.	  See	  under	  ‘Originality’.	  	  
Practical	   implications	   –	   The	   paper	   calls	   for	   a	   discussion	   on	  ways	   in	   which	   governments	   and	   businesses	   can	  
enhance	  social	  responsibility	  though	  balancing	  the	  requirements	  of	  more	  engagement	  from	  businesses	  as	  well	  
as	  public	  sector	  companies	  in	  CSR.	  The	  paper	  suggest	  some	  instrumental	  mechanisms	  of	  how	  governments	  can	  
engage	  not	  only	  multinational	  companies	  but	  also	  smaller	  companies	  and	  other	  kinds	  of	  organizations	  acting	  
on	  the	  market	  to	  make	  them	  engage	  more	  in	  CSR.	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Originality/value	  –	  The	  paper	  proposes	  a	  new	  Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principle	  to	  guide	  the	  development	  of	  new	  CSR-­‐models	  
based	   upon	   the	   core	   of	   Schwartz	   and	   Carroll’s	   ‘Three-­‐domain	   CSR-­‐model’,	   which	   the	   Principle	   extends	   and	  
revises	  to:	  Economy,	  L/Egal,	  Environment,	  and	  Ethics.	  This	  Principle	  disentangles	   the	  dialectic	   relationship	  
between	   economic	   and	   social	   responsibility;	   takes	   financial	   products	   into	   a	   consideration;	   refines	   the	  
definitions	  of	   good	   stakeholder	   engagement	  without	   the	   illusions	  of	   corporate	   ‘Potemkinity’1;	   and	   considers	  
the	   benefit	   of	   replacing	   the	   semiotic	   meaning	   of	   the	   ‘C’	   in	   CSR	   from	   ‘corporate’	   to	   ‘capitalism’s	   social	  
responsibility’	  in	  order	  to	  extend	  the	  concept	  towards	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  market	  agents.	  
KEYWORDS:	  Corporate	  social	  responsibility,	  CSR-­‐concepts,	  financial	  crisis,	  financial	  sector,	  government	  role.	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Introduction:	  The	  financial	  crisis	  2008	  
Financial	  sector	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Lehmann	  Brothers,	  Bear	  Stearns,	  Merrill	  Lynch,	  Freddy	  Mac,	  
Fanny	   Mae,	   Golden	   Sachs,	   Morgan	   Stanley,	   and	   CitiGroup	   among	   others	   have	   been	   accused	   of	  
initiating	   the	   financial	  crisis	   in	  2008	  and	  the	  current	  pandemic	  global	   recession	  due	  to	   the	  negative	  
effects	   of	   subprime	  mortgage	   lending	   (Hellwig	   2008,	  White	   2008,	   Reinhart	   and	   Rogoff	   2008,	   2009,	  
Herzig	   and	  Moon	   forthcoming).	   The	   subprime	  mortgage	   lending	   consisted	   of	   high-­‐risk	   investments	  
in	  mortgages	   to	   illiquid	  borrowers	  and	   risk-­‐reduction	  of	   losses	  by	  covering	  up	   risky	   loans	  with	   less-­‐
risky	   loans	   in	   the	   so-­‐called	   derivatives	   such	   as	   Credit	   Default	   Swaps	   (CDS)2,	   Mortgage-­‐Backed	  
Securities	   (MBS),	   Asset-­‐Backed	   Securities	   (ABS)	   and	   Collateralized	   Debt	   Obligations	   (CDO)	   sold	   on	  
the	  global	  investment	  markets	  (see	  Hellwig	  2008	  and	  Schwarcz	  2008	  for	  further	  explanation	  of	  these	  
financial	  instruments).	  	  
The	   idea	  was	   that	   the	  rising	  house-­‐prices	  could	  pay	  back	   these	  sub-­‐prime	   loans	  when	  the	  borrower	  
sold	   their	  houses	   in	   the	   future	  due	   to	  a	  belief	   that	   the	  housing	  prices	   could	  not	   stall	  –	   at	   least	  not	  
before	   the	   lenders	  had	  secured	   their	   risks	  and	  sold	   it	  off	   in	   the	   international	  market	  –	  a	  blind	   faith	  
in	   the	   so-­‐called	   “house-­‐bubble”	   (Schwarcz	   2008,	   Reinhart	   and	   Rogoff	   2009).	   However,	   this	   house-­‐
bubble	  was	   not	   detached	   from	   other	   global	   financial	   events	   happening	   prior	   to	   the	   2008	   financial	  
crisis.	   Financial	   bubbles	   have	   been	   seen	   from	   other	   sectors	   than	  mortgage-­‐loans	   for	   sky-­‐rocketing	  
house	  prices,	  for	   instance	  an	  art-­‐bubble	  was	  recognized	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  housing-­‐bubble,	  the	  
IT	   bubble	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   2000s,	   and	   in	   the	   1990s	   the	   Asian	  market	   relived	   a	   financial	   crisis,	  
the	  oil-­‐crisis	  of	   the	  1970s	  and	  the	  meltdown	   in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  we	  could	  continue	  beyond	  the	  Great	  
Depression	   in	   1930s	   and	   trace	   circles	   of	   manias	   and	   depressive	   periods	   throughout	   centuries	   as	  
Galbraith	   (1994),	   Reinhart	   and	   Rogoff	   (2008),	   and	   Kindleberger	   and	   Aliber	   (2011)	   have	   shown	  
evidence	  of.	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Not	  all	   financial	  crises	  have	  been	  caused	  by	   ‘bubbles’;	  others	  have	  been	   initiated	  by	  recessions	  due	  
to	  earlier	  warfare	  such	  as	  the	  Great	  Depression	   in	  1930s,	  and	  others	  due	  to	  the	  shortage	  of	  natural	  
resources	   such	   as	   oil	   findings	   (Reinhart	   and	   Rogoff	   2009).	   The	   big	   question	   is:	   how	   could	   these	  
developments	  be	  allowed	  to	  happen	  when	  it	  is	  historically	  known	  that	  prices	  cannot	  rise	  inevitably?	  
In	   a	  Galbraithian	   sardonic	   sense	   historic	  memory	   seems	   to	   be	   the	  most	   short-­‐lived	   in	   the	   financial	  
sector	   of	   all	   fields	   (Galbraith	   1994)	   collectively	   backed	   with	   a	   renewed	   faith	   in	   “this	   time	   it	   is	  
different”	   (cited	  from	  book-­‐title	  by	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  2009).	  White	  (2008)	  suggests	  that	  we	  trace	  
the	   historic	   development	   of	   the	   current	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   back	   to	   the	   beginning	   of	   early	   1990s,	  
where	  the	  US	  investment	  bank	  JP	  Morgan	  invented	  a	  way	  to	  reduce	  loan	  risks	  in	  the	  business	  sector	  
using	  a	   technique	  known	   from	  other	  areas	   such	  as	   farming;	   to	   spread	   risks	  over	  a	  market	  of	  Credit	  
Default	  Swaps	  (CDS).	  With	  the	  case	  of	  Enron,	  JP	  Morgan	  had	  high-­‐risk	  loans	  that	  would	  have	  drained	  
them	  for	  doing	  other	  businesses.	  With	  the	  new	  CDS	  the	  risk	  of	  loosing	  credit	  was	  reduced	  due	  to	  the	  
spread	  on	  a	  market	  of	  multiple	  investors,	  which	  meant	  that	  JP	  Morgan	  could	  continue	  their	  business	  
with	  other	  companies.	  	  
What	   seemed	   to	   be	   an	   innovation	   of	   security	   and	   stabilizing	   funding	   matter	   to	   secure	   financial	  
institutions	  by	  sharing	  both	  high-­‐risk	  and	   low-­‐risk	   loans	  soon	  diffused	  to	  other	  financial	   institutions	  
as	   ‘the’	   idea	   of	   the	   century;	   derivatives	   diffused	   the	   financial	   markets	   so	   fast	   that	   they	   became	  
mainframe	  for	  taking	  even	  higher	  risks	   in	  subprime	  mortgages.	  The	  rapid	  diffusion	  effect	  concerned	  
the	  American	  federal	  regulators,	  who	  in	  late	  1990s	  suggested	  a	  regulation	  of	  the	  derivatives	  that	  did	  
not	  fall	  under	  normal	  financial	  products	  due	  to	  their	  fear	  of	  a	  coming	  financial	  meltdown.	  However,	  
a	   massive	   lobby	   against	   regulating	   the	   derivative	   market	   lead	   by	   the	   largest	   bank,	   CitiCorp,	   and	  
leading	  politicians	   such	  as	  Alan	  Greenspan,	  made	  a	  de-­‐regulation	  possible,	  which	  meant	   that	  banks	  
could	   now	   engage	   in	   investments	   or	   merge	   with	   investment	   companies	   and	   get	   involved	   in	   the	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market	  of	  mortgages	  and	  the	  derivatives1;	  a	  market	  that	  now	  exploded	  into	  consumer-­‐related	  risks;	  
the	   high-­‐risk	   subprime	   mortgages.	   One	   of	   the	   arguments	   in	   this	   lobbyism	   stems	   from	   Clinton’s	  
political	  promises	  when	  he	  took	  office.	  
Bill	  Clinton	  promised	  in	  1995	  that	  every	  American	  was	  entitled	  to	  own	  a	  house	  (White	  House	  1995).	  
No	   Americans	   should	   be	   forced	   to	   live	   in	   miserable	   conditions	   without	   shelter,	   and	   the	   American	  
society	  was	   rich	   enough	   to	   reduce	   the	   income-­‐gap	   by	   offering	   poor	   families	   a	   house.	   The	   financial	  
sector	   responded	   by	   a	   pressure	   on	   the	   president	   to	   abrogate	   the	   Glass-­‐Steagall-­‐Act	   and	   allow	   for	  
banks	  to	  engage	  in	  investments,	  merge	  with	  investing	  companies	  and	  make	  riskier	  loans	  not	  only	  for	  
businesses	   but	   also	   for	   mortgages	   for	   everyday	   people	   and	   families	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   this	   policy,	  
which	  resulted	  in	  the	  Gramm-­‐Leach-­‐Bliley	  Act	  in	  1999	  that	  liberalized	  the	  financial	  market	  and	  made	  
high-­‐risk	   loans	   become	   possible	   known	   as	   the	   subprime	   mortgages	   (White	   2008).	   Practically	  
insolvent	   loan-­‐takers	   could	   now	   finance	   a	   house	   through	   mortgages	   they	   would	   not	   have	   been	  
granted	  before;	   the	  so-­‐called	  NINJA-­‐loans:	  Loans	   to	  ordinary	  people	  with	  No	   Interests,	  No	   Jobs	  and	  
Assets3	  	  (Partnoy	  2009).	  
In	   the	   EU	   the	   same	   liberalization	   of	   the	   financial	   market	   took	   place	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   later	   (Vives	  
2001),	  and	  many	   large	  banks	  and	   investment	  companies	  as	   the	  German	   IKB	  Bank,	  Credit	  Suisse	  and	  
many	   others	   invested	   aggressively	   in	   the	   subprime	   mortgage	   derivatives,	   which	   soon	   diffused	   to	  
even	  the	  smallest	  banks	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  meant	  that	  banks	  went	  
bankrupt,	  as	  did	  borrowers	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  Some	  had	  to	   leave	  their	  houses,	  be	   indebted	  for	   life,	  
broke,	   and	   go	   personally	   bankrupt.	   This	   irresponsibility	   has	   lead	   to	   the	   current	   global	   recession	   in	  
all	   types	   of	   sectorial	   business	   sectors	   as	  well	   as	   the	   public	   sector	   affecting	   a	   tremendous	   range	   of	  
citizens	  living	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  society	  (Partnoy	  2009).	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This	   paper	   examines	  what	   happened	   to	   the	   concept	   and	   practice	   of	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	  
(CSR)	   since	   this	   movement	   apparently	   had	   not	   enough	   clout	   to	   prevent	   another	   financial	   crisis.	  
Although	  the	  OECD	  Guidelines	  and	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  and	  other	   ‘soft	   law’	  officially,	  politically,	  
and	   institutionally	   made	   CSR	   equal	   good	   business	   conduct,	   these	   instruments	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  
able	   to	  avoid	   the	   irresponsible	  behaviour	  of	   the	   financial	   sector.	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   financial	   crisis	  
has	   overwhelmed	   and	   overshadowed	   all	   other	   types	   of	   crises,	   such	   as	   ecological	   crises,	  
environmental	  crises,	  and	  human	  rights	  crises,	  which	  was	  among	  the	  ‘causes’	  of	  the	  CSR	  blossoming,	  
and	   therefore	   the	   paper	   highlight	   the	   state	   of	   the	   art	   of	   CSR	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	  
through	  a	   literature	   review	  of	   the	  discursive	  changes	  of	   the	  CSR	  debates	  before	  and	  after	   the	  2008	  
event.	   The	   question	   of	   how	   CSR	   is	   developing	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   will	   be	   addressed	   exclusively	  
although	   CSR	   in	   this	   paper	   generally	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   umbrella	   framing	   all	   business	   sectors.	   The	  
research	  question	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  therefore:	  
What	  has	  happened	  to	  CSR	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  comparison	  to	  before?	  
CSR	  before	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
Corporate	   social	   responsibility	   accelerated	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s	   as	   a	   response	   to	   growth	   in	  
wealth	   and	   business	   profit	   as	   mentioned	   prior	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	   (Caroll	   and	   Shabana	   2010),	  
although	  the	  history	  of	  CSR	  can	  be	  dated	  back	  after	  the	  World	  War	  II	  (Moura-­‐Leite	  and	  Padget	  2011)	  
and	  in	  some	  nations	  even	  further	  back	  to	  the	  19th	  century	  (Bannerje	  2008).	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Figure	  1:	  scholarly	  work	  of	  CSR	  and	  related	  fields	  based	  on	  ”phrase/words”	  within	  their	  titles;	  published	  per	  year	  from	  1900	  –	  2012.	  
source:	  google	  scholar,	  retrieved	  March	  9th	  2013.	  
CSR	  in	  theory	  
Traditionally	  CSR-­‐debates	  have	  fluctuated	  between	  two	  poles:	  1)	  The	  normative/dogmatic,	  business-­‐
case,	   profitability	   school	   (Friedman	   1970,	   Jensen	   2000,	   Porter	   and	   Kramer	   2002,	   2006)	   and	   2)	   the	  
stakeholder	  school	  (Freeman	  1984,	  Carroll	  1991,	  Donaldson	  and	  Preston	  1995,	  Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  
2003,	  Matten	  and	  Moon	  2008,	  Freeman	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Garriga	  and	  Melé	  (2004)	  provided	  an	  extended	  
overview	  over	  these	  types	  of	  schools	  and	  suggested	  four	  different	  types	  of	  CSR-­‐traditions:	  	  
• The	   ‘instrumental’	   school	   emphasizing	   strategic	  management	   for	   economic	   wealth	   creation	  
for	   the	  corporation	  as	   its	   sole	   social	   responsibility	   (e.g.	   Friedman	  1970,	   Jensen	  2002,	  Porter	  
and	  Kramer	  2002,	  2006,	  Hart	  and	  Christensen	  2002,	  Prahalad	  and	  Hammond	  2002,	  Prahalad	  
2002);	  	  
• The	   ‘political’	   school	   emphasizing	   the	   power-­‐asymmetry	   between	   the	   corporation	   and	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Donaldson	  and	  Dunfee	  1994,	  Andrioff	  and	  McIntoch	  2001,	  Wood	  and	  Lodgdon	  2002,	  Matten	  
and	  Crane	  2005,	  2007);	  	  
• The	   ‘integrative’	   school	  based	  on	  contingency	  aspects	  between	   the	  corporation	  and	  society,	  
which	   emphasize	   the	   integration	   of	   social	   demands	   into	   the	   business	   (e.g.	   Sehti	   1975,	  
Preston	   and	   Post	   1975,	   Vogel	   1986,	   2005,	   Wartick	   and	   Mahon	   1994,	   Mitchell	   et	   al.	   1997,	  
Agle	   and	  Mitchell	   1999,	   Rowley	   1997,	   Carroll	   1979,	   1991,	  Wartick	   and	  Cockran	   1985,	  Wood	  
1991,	  Swanson	  1995,	  Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  2003,	  Matten	  and	  Moon	  2004,	  2008);	  and	  	  
• The	   ‘ethical	   school’	   emphasizing	   moral	   values	   as	   ethical	   obligations	   above	   any	   other	  
considerations	   (e.g.	   Freeman	  1984,	  1994,	  Brundtland	  Report	  1987,	   Evan	  and	  Freeman	  1988,	  
Donaldson	   and	   Preston	   1995,	   UN	  Global	   Compact	   1999,	   Philips	   2003,	  Melé	   2002,	   Philips	   et	  
al.	  2003)	  (Garriga	  and	  Melé	  2004,	  pp.	  52-­‐53	  +	  63-­‐644).	  	  
The	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘business	   case	   of	   CSR’	   gained	   prominence	   especially	   scholars	   such	   as	   Porter	   and	  
Kramer	   (2006)	   referring	   to	   the	   profitability	   and	   competitive	   advantages	   of	   strategic	   CSR	   upon	   the	  
financial	   bottom-­‐line.	   They	   suggested	   a	   license-­‐to-­‐operation	   approach	   to	   CSR	   in	   all	   kinds	   of	  
businesses	   (Porter	   and	   Kramer	   2006,	   p.	   4).	   They	   highlight	   the	   inconsistencies	   in	   which	   companies	  
report	  their	  social	  responsibilities	  detached	  from	  the	  overall	  performance	  that	  companies	  might	  do.	  
Referring	   to	   the	   vast	   variety	   of	   CSR-­‐reporting	   styles	   Porter	   and	   Kramer	   craved	   a	  more	   transparent	  
and	   in-­‐depth	   reporting-­‐style	   for	   companies	   to	   document	   their	   impact	   upon	   society	   instead	   of	   the	  
PR-­‐like	   storytelling	   that	   shows	   nothing	   concrete	   and	   reliable	   such	   as	   following	   the	   principle	   of	   the	  
triple-­‐bottom-­‐line.	   Porter	   and	   Kramer	   took	   the	   strategic	   stance	   towards	   CSR	   claiming	   it	   should	   be	  
deeply	   connected	   with	   the	   overall	   economic	   performance	   interests	   of	   the	   company.	   Their	   CSR-­‐
concept	   of	   Shared	   Value	   highlight	   that	   “a	   healthy	   society	   needs	   successful	   companies.	   No	   social	  
program	   can	   rival	   the	   business	   sector	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   creating	   the	   jobs,	   wealth,	   and	   innovation	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that	   improve	   standards	   of	   living	   and	   social	   conditions	   over	   time”	   (Porter	   and	   Kramer	   2006,	   p.	   5).	  
Furthermore,	   they	  argued	   if	  governments	  weaken	  the	  ability	  of	  businesses	   to	  operate	  productively,	  
they	   may	   constrain	   the	   businesses	   so	   much	   that	   competiveness	   fade,	   wages	   stagnate	   and	   jobs	  
disappear	   eventually.	   This	   wealth	   creation,	   Porter	   and	   Kramer	   saw	   as	   equally	   important	   as	   the	  
sustainability	   and	   social	   responsibility	   that	   companies	   should	   apply	   as	   well,	   because	   when	   wealth	  
decreases,	   tax	   income,	   philanthropy	   and	   voluntary	   do-­‐good	   evaporates.	   Porter	   and	   Kramer’s	  
argument	  that	  CSR	  prevail	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  and	  that	  strategic	  CSR	   is	  the	  answer	  to	   improve	  
CSR	   results	   in	   general	   has,	   however,	   not	   proved	   sustainable	   which	   the	   financial	   crisis	   is	   an	  
outstanding	  evidence	  of5.	  	  
Carroll	   (1991)	   supported	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   business	   case	   of	   adopting	   CSR,	   however,	   in	   a	   slightly,	   but	  
importantly,	  changed	  version:	  “Only	  when	  ﬁrms	  are	  able	  to	  pursue	  CSR	  activities	  with	  the	  support	  of	  
their	  stakeholders	  can	  there	  be	  a	  market	  for	  virtue	  and	  a	  business	  case	  for	  CSR”	  (Caroll	  and	  Shabana	  
2010,	   p.102).	   Carroll	   distinguished	   from	   Friedman	   in	   the	   proﬁt	   principle	   that	   was	   originally	   set	   in	  
terms	  of	  ‘acceptable	  proﬁts’	  and	  not	  the	  version	  of	  ‘maximizing	  profits’	  for	  shareholders	  in	  Carroll’s	  
terminology	  (Carroll	  1991,	  p.	  41).	  	  
One	  of	   the	  most	   cited	  and	   influential	   CSR-­‐models	   in	   the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  was	  Carroll’s	   (1991)	   ‘The	  
Pyramid	   of	   CSR’,	   which	   he	   and	   Schwartz	   (2003)	   later	   refined	   and	   revised	   into	   the	   ‘Three	   Domain	  
Approach’	   (Matten	   and	   Crane	   2005,	   Visser	   2006).	   The	   former	   four-­‐dimensional	   ‘Pyramid	   of	   CSR’	  
capturing	   an	   economic	   base,	   a	   legal	   layer,	   an	   ethical	   part	   and	   at	   the	   top	   the	   philanthropic	  
engagement	   was	   criticized	   due	   to	   the	   masses	   of	   companies,	   who	   took	   ‘philanthropy’	   as	   the	   most	  
important	  claim	  of	   them	  being	  socially	   responsible.	  Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  argued	   that	   the	   rigidity	  of	  
the	   layered	   four-­‐dimensional	   pyramid	  made	   readers	   and	   businesses	   to	  misunderstand	   the	   purpose	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of	  it	  and	  it	  lead	  them	  to	  think	  that	  if	  they	  only	  added	  philanthropic	  donations	  they	  were	  exercising	  a	  
full	   concept	   of	   CSR	   (Schwartz	   and	   Carroll	   2003,	   p.	   505).	   The	   new	   three-­‐domain	   approach	   Schwartz	  
and	  Carroll	  suggest	   is	  not	   leaving	  the	   idea	  of	   ‘philanthropy’	  as	  a	  part	  of	  CSR,	  however,	  they	  merged	  
the	  ‘philanthropy’	   into	  the	  ‘ethical’	  part	  de-­‐emphasizing	  it	  as	  the	  uttermost	  imperative	  as	  a	  top	  in	  a	  
pyramid	   could	   suggest.	   The	   ‘three	   domain	   approach’	   is	   their	   answer	   to	   a	  more	   integrated	   and	   less	  
layered	   concept	   expressed	   no	   longer	   in	   a	   pyramid	   shape	   with	   hierarchical	   divisions	   but	   in	   a	   co-­‐
dimensional	  Venn-­‐diagram	  (see	  Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  2003,	  p.	  509,	  figure	  2):	  
	   	  
The	  Pyramid	  of	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  (Carroll	  1991)	   The	  Three-­‐Domain	  Model	  of	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  
(Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  2003)	  
	  
The	  new	  Three-­‐Domain	  model	  of	  CSR	  was	  highlighted	   for	   its	   improved	   integration	  of	   the	  economic,	  
legal,	   and	   ethical	   concepts	   that	   is	   non-­‐stratified	   according	   to	   the	   old	   definitions,	   however	   the	  
revised	   model	   seems	   to	   have	   parts	   that	   some	   might	   not	   align	   with	   CSR-­‐principles:	   The	   ‘Purely	  
economic’	  (profit	  or	  shareholder	  maximization	  of	  economic	  benefits	  whether	  their	  conduct	  is	   illegal	  
or	  passively	   complies	  with	   the	   legislation)	   (Schwartz	   and	  Carroll	   2003,	  pp.	   513-­‐514)	  does	  not	   seem	  
to	  comply	  with	  other	  CSR-­‐models	  except	  from	  Friedman’s	   (1970)	   ideas.	  Thus	   it	   is	  under-­‐emphasized	  
in	   their	   overall	   description	   of	   the	  model,	   which	   tries	   to	   draw	   the	   readers	   attention	   to	   the	  middle	  
core	   of	   the	   Three-­‐Domain	   CSR-­‐model:	   The	   simultaneously	   economic/legal/ethical	   part	   (any	   activity	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simultaneously	   stimulated	   by	   economic,	   legal	   and	   ethical	   interests,	   for	   instance	   obeying	   ethical	  
concerns	  and	  laws	  in	  production	  and	  the	  trading	  of	  goods)	  (Schwartz	  and	  Carroll	  2003,	  pp.	  518-­‐520),	  
which	  is	  highlighted	  as	  where	  the	  most	  activities	  (should)	  take	  place.	  
The	   majority	   of	   CSR-­‐concepts	   emphasize	   the	   ‘multiple	   stakeholder	   approach’,	   which	   discursively	  
dominates	  the	  purely	  economic	  and	  rational	  choice	  perspectives	  of	  CSR	  (e.g.	  Friedman	  1970,	  Jensen	  
2002).	   Albeit	   stakeholder	   theory	   is	   a	   field	   of	   its	   own	   and	   seen	   from	   Freeman’s	   (1984)	   perspective	  
somewhat	   in	   ‘competition’	  with	   the	   concept	   of	   CSR	   of	  which	   Freeman	   accuses	   of	   having	   becoming	  
“an	   ‘add-­‐on’	   to	  a	  given	  profit-­‐making	  corporate	   strategy”	   (Freeman	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  238)	  and	  suffers	  
from	  the	   ‘separation-­‐thesis’:	  “The	  discourse	  of	  ethics	  can	  be	  separated	  so	   that	  sentences	   like	   ‘x	   is	  a	  
business	   decision’	   have	   no	   moral	   content,	   and	   ‘x	   is	   a	   moral	   decision’	   have	   no	   business	   content”	  
(Freeman	   1994,	   p.	   412).	   Freeman	   was	   inspired	   by	   Sen	   (1987)	   and	   Putnam	   (2002)	   ideas	   of	   the	  
‘collapse	  of	  the	  fact/value-­‐dichotomy’	  suggesting	  that	   ‘economy’	   is	   inherently	  entangled	  matters	  of	  
‘ethics’	  and	  “the	  false	  dichotomization	  of	  the	  two	  has	  impoverished	  discipline-­‐based	  analysis	  in	  both	  
economics	   and	   ethics”	   (Freeman	   2010,	   p.	   68).	   Sandberg	   (2008a)	   listed	   nine	   different	   ways	   to	  
interpret	   Freeman’s	   response	   of	   this	   ‘separation-­‐thesis’	   and	   showed	   how	   this	   thesis	   lacks	  
clarification,	  which	  might	  explain	  why	  the	  debate	  around	  it	  has	  had	  a	  hard	  time	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  
it	  (Sandberg	  2008b).	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  debate	  Freeman	  acknowledge	  the	  CSR-­‐literature	  taking	  the	  idea	  
behind	   his	   stakeholder	   theory	   seriously	   and	   that	   this	   theory	   is	   well	   suited	   to	   inform	   and	   develop	  
concepts	   of	   CSR	   in	   order	   “to	   guide	   managers	   towards	   how	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   deal	   with	   the	  
complex	  reality	  they	  face”	  (Freeman	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  224).	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CSR	  in	  business	  practices	  
Research	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   business	   case	   was	   hard	   to	   find	   profitable	   in	   the	   2000s	   (Gupte	   2005,	  
Schreck	   2010)	   however,	   there	   were	   indirectly	   many	   gains	   of	   CSR	   that	   might	   impact	   the	   profit	  
eventually	   (Vogel	  2005).	  Vogel	   argued	   if	  Wal-­‐Mart,	  Nike	  and	  British	  Petroleum	  did	  not	  address	  CSR	  
whether	  profitable	  or	  not,	   it	  might	   impact	   their	  overall	   sales,	  because	  customers	  and	   legislators	  do	  
care	   about	   how	  multinationals	   conduct	   their	   businesses	   and	   impact	   workers,	   children,	   the	   nature	  
and	  the	  climate	  (Vogel	  2005,	  pp.	  164-­‐166).	  
Another	  significant	  and	  widely	  cited	  CSR-­‐concept,	  however,	  have	  questioned	  the	  typically	  American	  
ideology	   of	   CSR	   as	   entirely	   voluntary	   for	   private	   corporations	   in	   suggesting	   that	   CSR	   can	   also	   be	   a	  
responsibility	   that	   is	   secured	   by	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   state,	   union	   agreements,	   implicit	   cultural	  
and	   institutional	   norms	   and	   other	   non-­‐explicit	   behaviours.	   The	   Matten	   and	   Moon	   (2004,	   2008)	  
‘Implicit/Explicit’	   approach	   to	   CSR	   recognizes	   that	   not	   all	   CSR	   is	   entirely	   –	   as	   the	   above	   theories	  
embed	  –	  voluntary;	  Especially	  in	  the	  EU	  some	  part	  of	  CSR	  is	  highly	  integrated	  in	  institutional	  norms,	  
values	   and	   (regulated)	   legislation.	   This	   perspective	   has	   led	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   blossoming	   European	  
research,	  which	  is	  mainly	  followed	  after	  the	  entrance	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  (e.g.	  Hiss	  2009,	  Höllerer	  
2012,	  own	  publication).	  A	  range	  of	  scholars	  from	  Europe	  have	  shown	  how	  ‘implicit’	  CSR	  consisting	  of	  
values,	  norms,	  and	  rules	  codified	  and	  mandatory	  as	  within	  legislation	  requirements	  for	  corporations	  
have	   become	   more	   ‘explicit’	   especially	   after	   the	   OECD	   enrolment	   of	   (quasi-­‐)	   privatization	   of	   the	  
public	   administration	   into	   voluntary	   corporate	   policies,	   programs	   and	   strategies	   (e.g.	   Argandoña	  
and	   Hoivik	   2009,	   Hiss	   2009,	   Meyer	   and	   Höllerer	   2010,	   Jackson	   and	   Apostolakou	   2010,	   own	  
publication,	  Höllerer	  2012).	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Finally,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  and	  other	  ‘soft	  laws’	  was	  published	  in	  late	  1990s	  
(e.g.	  OECD	  2001	   revision	   of	   the	  Guidelines)	  made	  CSR	  become	  officially	   and	  politically	   accepted	   as	  
institutionalized	  into	  business	  excellence.	  
CSR	  in	  financial	  business	  practices	  
The	   historical	   period	   from	   the	   release	   of	   governmental	   regulation	   according	   to	   the	   Gramm-­‐Leach-­‐
Bliley-­‐Act	   (1999)	   and	   onwards	   is	   interesting	   to	   trace	   how	   this	   sector	   approached	   CSR.	   Heal	   (2004)	  
provided	   a	   pre-­‐crisis	   overview	  of	   CSR	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   defining	   CSR	   as	   “a	   program	  of	   actions	  
taken	  to	  reduce	  externalized	  costs	  or	  to	  avoid	  distributional	  conflicts”	   in	  response	  to	  market	  failures	  
(Heal	  2004,	  p.	  1).	  Responsible	  banking/investing6	  is	  to	  avoid	  such	  distributional	  conflicts	  that	  causes	  
harm	   to	   the	   clients	   of	   the	   bank	   or	   investment	   company	   e.g.	   insider	   trading,	   where	   privileged	  
personnel	  or	  organizations	  exploit	   their	  access	  to	   information	  for	  their	  own	  benefit	   instead	  of	  their	  
clients	   or	   the	   public	   is	   a	   conflict	   of	   proper	   distribution	   of	   gains	   from	   participation	   in	   a	   general	  
financial	  market	  (cf.	  Heal	  2004,	  p.	  26).	  The	  avoidance	  of	  allocation	  of	  under-­‐valued	  shares	  to	  people	  
that	   can	   bring	   them	   additional	   business,	   fake	   bids,	   rigged	   auctions	   or	   volume-­‐contingent	  
commissions	  are	  also	  important	  (Heal	  2004,	  p.	  26).	  	  
The	   ‘Equator	   Principles7’	   initiated	   in	   2002	   refers	   to	   socially	   responsible	   criteria	   such	   as	   the	   above	  
avoidances.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Equator	  Principles	  is	  to	  prevent	  banks	  and	  investment	  companies	  to	  
engage	   in	   social	   irresponsible	   companies	   that	   take	   loans	   for	   more	   than	   $50	  million	   and	   indirectly	  
involve	   these	  banks	   in	  accusations	  of	  major	  pollution	  or	  human	   rights	   violation	  or	  other	  anti-­‐social	  
use	   of	   their	   funds	   (Heal	   2004,	   p.	   28).	   The	   Equation	   Principles,	   though,	   have	   been	   criticized	   by	  
various	   NGOs	   for	   not	   preventing	   their	   members	   of	   investing	   in	   anti-­‐social	   projects,	   which	   makes	  
their	  trustworthiness	  spurious	  at	  the	  time	  being	  (Herzig	  and	  Moon	  year,	  p.	  11).	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The	  positive	  side	  of	  responsible	  banking	  both	  contemporary	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  the	  
diffusion	   of	   micro-­‐credits	   for	   poor	   people	   and	   entrepreneurs	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   social	  
entrepreneurship	  movement	   for	   instance	   in	   India	  and	  Africa	   (Mayoux	  2001,	  Sapovadia	  2006,	   for	  an	  
overview	   see	  Hockerts	   et	   al.	   2006).	   Banks	   and	   investment	   companies	  were	   not	   absent	   in	   revealing	  
social	   reports;	   however,	   they	  were	  not	   reporting	   their	   activities	   in	   a	  way	   that	  would	  make	   readers	  
alarmed	   over	   their	   conduct	   due	   to	   their	   ‘normalization’	   of	   their	   practice	   and	   their	   little	   impact	  
towards	   environmental	   and	   social	   issues	   albeit	   they	   might	   not	   have	   revealed	   suspicious	  
relationships	   with	   controversial	   clients	   (Herzig	   and	  Moon	   forthcoming,	   Stray	   and	   Ballentine	   2000,	  
cited	  from	  the	  former).	  
Couplan	   (2006)	   investigated	   CSR-­‐reports	   in	   five	   major	   five	   banking	   groups:	   Lloyds/TSB,	   the	   Royal	  
Bank	   of	   Scotland,	   HSBC,	   Barclays	   and	   the	   Co-­‐operative	   Bank.	   She	   argued	   that,	   “rather	   than	   the	  
production	   of	   stand-­‐alone	   reports	   signalling	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   CSR	   considerations,	   in	   this	  
context	   they	   function	   to	   peripheralise	   the	   information”,	   and	   only	   some	   organizations	   were	   at	   the	  
time	   being	   “beginning	   to	   articulate	   a	   stance	   with	   regard	   to	   CSR,	   as	   increasingly	  more	   attention	   is	  
being	  paid	  to	  social	  and	  environmental	  issues”	  (Coupland	  2006,	  p.	  865).	  	  
These	   findings	   were	   similar	   to	   findings	   from	   banks	   from	   e.g.	   Singapore	   (Tsang	   1998);	   Malaysia	  
(Abdul	   and	   Ibrahim	   2002);	   the	   UK	   (Decker	   2004);	   Bangladesh	   (Kahn,	   Halabi,	   and	   Sami	   2009);	  
Australia	   (Pomering	   and	   Dolnicar	   2009);	   and	   a	   study	   of	   banks	   from	   Nigeria	   identified	   severe	  
problems	  with	  “self-­‐induced	  vices,	  regulatory	   laxity,	   inauspicious	  macro-­‐economic	  environment,	  and	  
endemic	  corruption	   in	   the	  economy	  as	   the	  major	  constraints	   to	   the	  discharge	  of	  CSR	   in	   the	  Nigerian	  
banking	   system”	   (Achua	  2008,	  p.	  57).	  Decker	   (2004)	  mentions,	  “in	   the	  UK	   retail	  banking	  sector,	   the	  
impact	   of	   CSR	   is	   increasingly	  manifest	   in	   the	   efforts	   to	   create	   a	   competitive	   advantage	   out	   of	   CSR	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strategies,	   the	   growing	   prominence	   of	   mutual	   financial	   institutions	   in	   government	   policy	   and	  
collaborative	  efforts	  between	  a	  range	  of	  financial	  institutions”	  (Decker	  2004,	  p.	  712).	  
However,	   not	   all	   literature	   from	   the	   banking	   sector	   shows	   the	   same	   neglect	   of	   CSR:	   Viganò	   and	  
Nicolai	   (2006)	  found	  among	  European	  banks	  that	  although	  this	  banking	  sector	  had	  “been	  quite	  slow	  
in	  considering	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  sustainability,	  despite	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  their	  exposure	  to	  
risk	  having	  an	   intermediary	  role	   in	  the	  economy”	   (Viganò	  and	  Nicolai	  2006,	  p.	  5)	   they	  began	  as	  well	  
as	   their	   American	   colleagues	   (Jeucken	   2001)	   around	   the	   Millennium	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	  
sustainability	  in	  environmental	  and	  social	   issues.	  Jeucken	  (2001)	  supports	  Viganò	  and	  Nicolai	  (2006)	  
findings	   that	   research	   interests	   focused	   initially	   on	   the	   ‘direct	   risks’	   of	   banks	   being	   indirectly	  
involved	   in	   the	   financing	  of	  polluting	  activities	  by	   lending	  money	   to	   irresponsible	  companies.	   “Only	  
in	   the	   later	   years	   the	   ‘indirect	   risks’,	   such	   as	   reputation	   and	   responsibility	   of	   banks	   related	   to	  
lending	   activities	   (client’s	   solvency/continuity	   or	   collateral)	   were	   taken	   up	   and	   investigated	   in	   the	  
sector”	  (Viganò	  and	  Nicolai	  2006,	  p.	  5).	  	  	  
Martin	   Hellwig	   (2008)	   analysed	   the	   systemic	   risks	   in	   the	   financial	   sector	   leading	   to	   the	   2008	   sub-­‐
prime	   mortgage	   crisis,	   and	   found	   that	   the	   moral	   hazard	   and	   greed	   among	   bank	   and	   investment	  
companies	   managers	   led	   other	   managers	   invest	   in	   mortgage	   security	   instruments,	   which	   too	   was	  
unreliable,	   however,	   due	   to	   their	   complexity	   these	   managers	   found	   them	   secure	   especially	   those	  
compound	   packages	   (MBSs,	   CDOs,	   etc.)	   of	   risky	   sub-­‐prime	   loans	   mixed	   with	   high	   security	   loans	  
given	   top	   character	   by	   bank	   assurance	   companies	   or	   rating	   companies	   (Hellwig	   2008).	   Since	   these	  
instruments	   were	   ‘packages’	   that	   was	   ‘standardized’	   by	   accreditation	   companies,	   many	   managers	  
did	   not	   understand	   their	   full	   potential	   and	   inherent	   risk	   although	   they	   knew	   that	   these	   ‘packages’	  
consisted	  of	  both	  high-­‐risk	  and	   low-­‐risk	  mortgages.	  The	  belief	   in	   the	  up-­‐scaling	  of	  prices	  on	  houses	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and	   other	   assets,	   the	   market	   accepted	   that	   the	   risk	   was	   covered	   and	   spread	   to	   other	   investors	  
themselves,	  and	  no-­‐one	  believed	  that	  there	  would	  ever	  be	  a	  meltdown	  on	  the	  market,	  that	  seemed	  
only	   to	   go	   one	  way:	   up.	   Therefore,	   the	  market	   of	   financial	   goods	  were	   not	   regarded	   as	   a	   risk	   that	  
could	   explode,	  which	  was	  why	   it	  was	  never	  put	   into	   vocabulary	   to	   the	  public	   before	   the	  meltdown	  
was	   actual.	   Hellwig	   expresses	   this	   in	   three	   terms:	   “First,	   moral	   hazard	   in	   origination	   was	   not	  
eliminated,	   but	   was	   actually	   enhanced	   by	   several	   developments.	   Second,	   many	   of	   the	   mortgage-­‐
backed	  securities	  did	  not	  end	  up	  in	  the	  portfolios	  of	  insurance	  companies	  or	  pension	  funds,	  but	  in	  the	  
portfolios	   of	   highly	   leveraged	   institutions	   that	   engaged	   in	   substantial	  maturity	   transformation	   and	  
were	   in	   constant	   need	   of	   refinancing.	   Third,	   the	   markets	   for	   refinancing	   these	   highly	   leveraged	  
institutions	  broke	  down	  in	  the	  crisis”	  (Hellwig	  2008,	  p.	  14).	  	  
Political	   pressure	   from	  mortgage	   companies	   in	   their	   rivalling	   selling	   of	   high-­‐risk	   compounds	   upon	  
the	  accrediting	  companies	   to	  rate	  these	  compounds	  consisting	  of	  high-­‐risk	  sub-­‐prime	   loans	  and	  not	  
many	   low-­‐risk	   loans	   to	   be	   credited	   triple-­‐A	   as	   the	   highest	   mortgage	   security	   made	   poor	   quality	  
goods	   appear	   attractive	   for	   investment	   companies	   not	   knowing	   what	   they	   bought	   due	   to	   the	  
complexities	   of	   CDOs	   and	   MBSs.	   Since	   the	   track	   of	   a	   single	   high-­‐risk	   mortgage	   loan	   would	   be	  
covered	   up	   hundreds	   of	   times	   before	   reaching	   the	   investor	   in	   question	   after	  multiple	   of	   trades	   on	  
the	   market,	   no-­‐one	   could	   ever	   validate	   the	   real	   value	   of	   the	   goods	   eventually	   (Hellwig	   2008,	  
Demyanyk	  and	  Van	  Hemert	  2008,	  cited	  from	  the	  former).	  Therefore,	  in	  August	  2007	  a	  chain	  reaction	  
started	   involving	   a	   global	   net	   of	   banks	   and	   investment	   companies,	   which	   only	   a	   few	   analysts	   had	  
foreseen	  would	  come	  when	  the	  ‘bubble’	  did	  burst	  (Hellwig	  2008,	  p.	  38,	  Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  2008).	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CSR	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
CSR	  in	  theory	  
The	  academic	  debate	  of	  CSR	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	  has	   lately	  been	   fruitfully	  
addressed	   in	   recent	   years	   in	   the	   academic	   literature	   (e.g.	   Bannerje	   2008,	   Karnani	   2011a+b,	  
D’Anselmi	   2010,	   Schreck	   2010,	   Gianarakis	   and	   Theotokas	   2011,	   Hanson	   2011,	   Mackey	   2011,	   and	  
Moon	  forthcoming).	  This	  debate	  is	  very	  urging	  to	  continue	  since	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  
have	   not	   yet	   seemed	   to	   reveal	   any	   major	   changes	   to	   mitigate	   future	   effects	   from	   this	   type	   of	  
financial	   crisis	   (Souto	  2009).	   In	   the	  midst	  of	   the	  after-­‐effects	  of	   the	  2008-­‐financial	   crisis,	   corporate	  
social	  responsibility	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  subsumed	  the	  public	  debate	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  reining	  the	  greed,	  
the	   irresponsibility	  and	  the	  fallibility	  of	   the	   invisible	  hand	  of	   the	  market	   (Smith	  1776/2003,	  Emeseh	  
et	  al.	  2010).	  
New	   post-­‐crisis	   movements	   such	   as	   the	   ‘Conscious	   Capitalism’	   (O’Toole	   and	   Vogel	   2011,	   Hanson	  
2011,	   Mackey	   2011),	   ‘CSR	   2.0’	   (Visser	   2010a),	   the	   ‘USDIME’-­‐framework	   (D’Anselmi	   2010),	   and	   re-­‐
articulations	   of	   the	   sustainability	   approach	   (Aras	   and	   Crowther	   2008,	   2009,	   2010)	   view	   CSR	   and	  
business	  conduct	  from	  enlightened	  ethical,	  stakeholder-­‐based,	  and	  sustainable	  business	  practices.	  	  
‘Conscious	  Capitalism’	   is	  the	  business	  sector	  response	  to	  CSR	  as	  a	  movement	  celebrating	  Freeman’s	  
stakeholder	   theory	   and	   recognizes	   the	   need	   for	   businesses	   to	  make	   profits	   in	   a	   way	   claiming	   that	  
making	   money	   is	   not	   the	   most	   important	   in	   making	   business.	   CC	   claims	   its	   support	   for	   a	   higher	  
purpose	   to	   make	   meaning	   and	   motivation	   to	   inspire,	   engage	   and	   energize	   their	   stakeholders;	  
integrate	   ethics,	   social	   responsibility	   and	   sustainability	   practices	   into	   the	   core	   business	   strategies;	  
engage	   employees	   in	   decision	  making	   and	   the	   sharing	   of	   ownership	   and	   profits;	   and	   create	   value-­‐
based	  leaders	  without	  salaries	  of	  300-­‐500	  times	  their	  employees	  (cf.	  O’Toole	  and	  Vogel	  2011,	  p.	  61).	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This	   movement	   has	   its	   own	   webpage	   with	   Ed	   Freeman	   as	   their	   trustee	   (see	  
http://www.consciouscapitalism.org)	   in	   which	   they	   have	   managed	   to	   legitimize	   their	  
trustworthiness	   in	   the	   academic	   debate	   especially	   among	   professional	   peers	   (see	   California	  
Management	  Review	  2011,	  53	  (2)+(3)).	  However,	  this	  movement	  primarily	  driven	  by	  business	  sector	  
leaders	   is	   due	   to	   critique	   of	   academics	   such	   as	   Vogel	   and	   O’Toole,	   who	   praise	   the	   initiative	   but	  
misses	  evidence	   (and	   showing	  how	  business	  members	  of	   the	  movement	  have	   several	   shortcomings	  
trying	   to	   live	  up	   to	   these	   claims)	  of	   the	  unrealistic	  expectations	  of	   corporate	  performance	   that	   the	  
movement	   claim	   to	   serve	   (O’Toole	   and	   Vogel	   2011).	   Business	   leaders	   engaged	   in	   the	   ‘Conscious	  
Capitalism’	   (CC)	  movement,	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   claim	   never	   to	   have	   said	   to	   be	   ‘virtuous’	   but	   to	   act	  
‘wisely’	   and	   ‘enlightened’	   (Hansson	   2011,	   Sisodia	   2011);	   “What	   matters	   are	   the	   principle,	   not	   the	  
terminology”	   (Rauch	  2011,	  p.	  92);	  and	  CC	  will	  not	  be	  solving	  all	   the	  problems	   in	   the	  world,	  but	  may	  
solve	  some	  problems	  (Mackey	  2011,	  p.	  90).	  	  	  	  
The	   ‘CSR	   2.0’	   is	   a	   conceptual	   idea	   developed	   by	  Wayne	   Visser	   (2010a+b)	   using	   the	  metaphor	   of	   a	  
computer	   analogy	   (the	  2.0)	  of	  CSR	   showing	   the	  historical	  development	  of	   ‘old’	  CSR	   to	   the	  new	  CSR	  
2.0.	  CSR	  1.0	  was	  about	  companies	  establishing	  relationships	  with	  different	  communities,	  engaging	  in	  
philanthropic	   contributions	   and	   image	   branding;	   now	  CSR	   2.0	   is	   about	   global	   commons,	   innovative	  
partnerships	   and	   stakeholder	   involvement.	   CSR	   1.0	   was	   about	   ‘one	   size	   fits	   all’	   meaning	  
standardization,	   accountability	   through	   external	   certifications	   and	   listing	   companies	   at	  
sustainability	  ranking	  lists,	  whereas	  CSR	  2.0	  is	  about	  decentralizing	  the	  power	  to	  shared	  local	  panels	  
of	  stakeholders,	  real-­‐time	  reporting	  and	  social	  entrepreneurship	  (Visser	  2010a,	  pp.	  144-­‐145).	  Visser	  
presents	   five	   concepts	   that	   make	   CSR	   2.0	   a	   success:	   A	   focus	   on	   creativity,	   scalability,	  
responsiveness,	   glocality	   and	   circularity	   as	   the	   mainframe	   of	   the	   new	   concept.	   Creativity	   is	  
important	   to	   escape	   the	   mere	   tick-­‐box	   approach	   to	   CSR	   due	   to	   mere	   standardization	   and	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accreditation;	   scalability	   is	   important	   to	   escape	   the	   charming	   case	   stories	   –	   to	   show	   how	   a	   real	  
change	   is	   lifted	  up	   to	   larger	   scales	  and	  not	   small,	  nice,	  once-­‐upon-­‐a-­‐time	  stories;	   responsiveness	   is	  
important	   to	   engage	   in	   cross-­‐sector	   partnerships	   and	   stakeholder-­‐driven	   approaches;	   glocality,	  
which	   is	   a	   term	   derived	   by	   the	   subtraction	   of	   ‘global’	   and	   ‘local’,	   emphasize	   the	   ‘think	   global,	   act	  
local’-­‐philosophy,	   where	   international	   norms	   should	   be	   implemented	   local;	   and	   circularity	   means	  
thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  cradle-­‐to-­‐cradle	  in	  production	  designing	  products	  that	  are	  inherently	  good	  in	  all	  
levels	  of	  processes	   (Visser	  2010a,	  pp.	  146-­‐147).	  However,	  Visser	   recognize	   the	  Sisyphean	  work	   that	  
CSR	   is	   facing:	   “We	   don’t	   need	   to	   go	   to	   extremes	   to	   prove	   the	   uneconomic	   nature	   of	  
responsibility...The	   fact	   of	   the	   matter	   is	   that,	   beyond	   basic	   legal	   compliance,	   the	   markets	   are	  
designed	   to	   serve	   the	   financial	  and	  economic	   interests	  of	   the	  powerful,	   not	   the	   idealistic	  dreams	  of	  
CSR	  advocates	  or	   the	  angry	  demands	  of	   civil	   society	  activists”	   (Visser	  2010a,	  pp.	  129).	  Visser	  offers	  
three	  options	  for	  taking	  CSR	  forward	  based	  on	  the	  major	  deficits	  CSR	  as	  idealism	  offers	  but	  have	  not	  
succeeded	   in	   persuading	   the	   business	   of	   performing:	   1)	   Recognize	   that	   role	   of	   CSR	   in	   the	   business	  
world	  is	  a	  tactic	  for	  reputation	  management;	  2)	  pretend	  that	  CSR	  is	  working	  and	  more	  of	  the	  same	  is	  
enough;	  and	  3)	  reconceptualise	  CSR	  as	  a	  radical	  or	  revolutionary	  concept	  to	  challenge	  the	  economic	  
model	  and	  offer	  genuine	  solutions	   to	  global	  challenges,	  which	   is	   the	   lead	  Visser	   follows	   in	  his	  offer	  
of	  the	  systemic	  CSR	  2.0	  (Visser	  2010a,	  pp.	  129-­‐130).	  	  
The	   ‘USDIME’-­‐framework	   is	   a	   concept	   developed	   by	   Paolo	   D’Anselmi	   (2010)	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
irresponsibility	   of	   business	   conduct	   focusing	   on	   “stewarding	   the	   unknown	   stakeholder,	   allowing	  
information	   disclosure,	   developing	   a	   culture	   of	   implementation,	   and	   exercising	   micro-­‐ethics”	  
(D’Anselmi	  2010,	  p.	  49).	  The	  ‘unknown	  stakeholder’	   is	  “he,	  who	  does	  not	  share	  a	  voice,	  who	  doesn’t	  
know	   he	   has	   a	   stake	   in	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   organization	   being	   analysed”	   (D’Anselmi	   2010,	   p.	   52),	  
and	  who	  needs	   to	  be	   told	  of	  his	   stakes	   through	  a	   fair	  and	  comparative	   ‘disclosure’	   from	  companies	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set	  up	  against	  each	  other.	  D’Anselmi	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  spread	  glamorous	  stories	  of	  how	  
good	   a	   certain	   company	   think	   they	   are;	   they	   need	   to	   show	   it	   with	   reliable	   data	   such	   as	  
benchmarking,	   that	   places	   the	   conduct	   of	   a	   specific	   company	   in	   comparison	   with	   competing	  
companies	   of	   the	   same	   kind	   so	   the	   ‘unknown	   stakeholder’	   can	   identify	   his	   actual	   stake	   or	   risk	   by	  
being	   involved	  or	  affected	  by	  the	  company.	  The	  companies	  disclosing	  their	  activities	  should	  engage	  
in	   a	   culture	   of	   ‘implementation’	   instead	   of	   pure	   politics	   and	   announcements,	   which	   can	   be	  
measured	   by	   reliable	   data	   instead	   of	   spurious	   announcements	   in	   the	   ‘disclosure’.	   Finally,	   by	   living	  
the	   ‘micro-­‐ethics’	   D’Anselmi	  means	   avoiding	   disinformation	   and	   not	   revealing	   faults	   of	   others,	   but	  
highlighting	  ethical	  values	  and	  results	  from	  e.g.	  whistle-­‐blowing,	  external	  claims	  upon	  the	  company,	  
and	  how	  they	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  ethics	  of	  e.g.	  stem	  cells,	  abortion	  and	  other	  crucial	  ethical	  stances	  
(D’Anselmi	  2010	  pp.	  49-­‐50).	  
Finally,	   the	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   the	   sustainability	   view	   of	   CSR	   (Aras	   and	   Crowther	   2008,	   2009,	   2010)	  
suggest	   a	   retrospective	   view	   towards	   the	   Gaia	   Hypothesis	   (Lovelock	   1979)	   and	   Brundtland	   Report	  
(1987)	  suggestions	  to	  sustainable	  behaviour	  and	  suggests	  an	   inclusion	  of	   ‘financial	  sustainability’	  as	  
a	   fourth	   dimension	   to	   the	   inclusiveness	   of	   ‘sustainability’	   inside	   CSR.	   The	   Gaia	   Hypothesis	   is	   ”a	  
model	   in	  which	   the	  whole	   of	   the	   ecosphere,	   and	   all	   living	  matter	   therein,	   is	   co-­‐dependent	   upon	   its	  
various	   facets	   and	   formed	   a	   complete	   system...interdependent	   and	   equally	   necessary	   for	  
maintaining	  the	  Earth	  as	  a	  planet	  capable	  of	  sustaining	   life”	   (Aras	  and	  Crowther	  2008,	  p.	  17).	  From	  
this	   departure	   Aras	   and	   Crowther	   has	   developed	   four	   core	   issues	   of	   sustainability	   of	   equal	  
importance:	  (1)	  ’societal	   influence’	  defined	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  society	  makes	  upon	  the	  
corporation	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   social	   contract	   and	   stakeholder	   influence;	   (2)	   ’environmental	   impact’,	  
defined	   as	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   corporation	   upon	   its	   geophysical	   environment;	   (3)	  
’organisational	   culture’,	   defined	   as	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   corporation	   and	   its	   internal	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stakeholders,	   particularly	   employees;	   and	   (4)	   ’finance’,	   understood	   in	   terms	  of	   an	   adequate	   return	  
for	   the	   level	   of	   risk	   undertaken	   (Aras	   and	   Crowther	   2008,	   cited	   from	   own	   publication	   2012).	   This	  
revival	   of	   the	   Magnum	   Opus	   wisdom	   of	   sustainability	   thoughts	   hybridized	   with	   contemporary	  
economic	  models	  of	  the	  corporation	  serves	  to	  remind	  that	  what	  was	  once	  ‘good	  religion’	  has	  almost	  
been	   forgotten	   and	   needs	   a	   refurbishment	   on	   tarnished	   CSR	   concepts	   exploited	   for	   corporate	  
reputation	  rather	  than	  practice.	  
Where	   CSR	   before	   the	   crisis	   was	   concerned	   about	   large	   multinational	   companies	   engaged	   in	  
sweatshop	   and	   supply	   chain	   activities	   involving	   violating	   human	   rights	   including	   child	   labour	  
(Buchholz	   and	   Carroll	   2009,	   Crane	   et	   al.	   2008),	   the	   gaze	   had	   afterwards	   turned	   towards	   the	  
scapegoats	  of	   the	   financial	  world	  such	  as	  banks,	   investing	  companies	  such	  as	   the	  Lehman	  Brothers,	  
Golden	  Sachs	  and	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddie	  Mac,	  nefarious	  accountants	  such	  as	  Arthur	  Anderson	  (the	  
Enron	   scandal)	   and	   other	  mortgage	   lenders,	   accrediting	   institutes	   and	  many	  more	   (Bannerje	   2008,	  
Souto	   2009,	   Karnani	   2011a+b,	   D’Aselmi	   2010,	   Emeseh	   et	   al.	   2010,	   Schreck	   2010,	   Gianarakis	   and	  
Theotokas	   2011,	   Hanson	   2011,	   Mackey	   2011,	   O’Toole	   and	   Vogel	   2011,	   Herzig	   and	   Moon	  
forthcoming).	   In	   this	   vein	   Emeseh	   et	   al.	   (2010)	   argue	   that	   multinational	   companies	   have	   been	  
surfing	   the	   skies	   for	   too	   long	   and	   need	   to	   be	   regulated	   and	   controlled	   more	   severely	   to	   prevent	  
greed,	   more	   bank	   failures	   and	   social	   collapse	   for	   citizen	   taxpayers	   and	   former	   house	   owners	   who	  
has	  been	  impoverished	  to	  emerge.	  	  
The	  above	  new	  CSR	  concepts	  includes,	  but	  (still)	  de-­‐emphasize	  profit	  as	  primary	  goal	  alone;	  extends	  
the	  multiple	   stakeholder	   orientation	   (Aras	   and	   Crowther	   2008,	   2009,	   2010,	   D’Anselmi	   2010,	   Visser	  
2010a+b);	   and	   continues	   to	   argue	   that	   business	   ethics,	   social	   responsibilities,	   and	   sustainability	  
practices	   can	   merge	   into	   the	   core	   business	   strategies	   (O’Toole	   and	   Vogel	   2011,	   Hanson	   2011,	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Mackey	   2011).	   These	   new	  movements	   do	   not	   flow	   without	   a	   critique.	   They	   have	   been	   accused	   of	  
naivety	  of	  those,	  who	  pray	  a	  more	   ‘realistic’	  version	  (O’Toole	  and	  Vogel	  2011)	  of	  business	  practices	  
and	  by	  those,	  who	  resonates	  the	  irresponsibility	  of	  businesses	  in	  general	  (Buzar	  et	  al.	  2010,	  Krkač	  et	  
al.	  2012).	  Wayne	  Visser	  proclaims	  “the	   impotence	  of	  CSR	   in	   the	   face	  of	  more	  systemic	  problems	  has	  
been	  nowhere	  more	  evident	  than	  in	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis”	  (Visser	  2010b,	  p.	  8).	  
These	  approaches,	  however,	   are	  not	  new:	   it	  has,	   as	   this	   review	  shows,	  been	  prominent	   in	   the	  CSR-­‐
literature	   even	   before	   the	   financial	   crisis	   albeit	  more	   emphasized	   in	   the	   industrial	   sector	   than	   the	  
financial	  sector.	  	  
CSR	  in	  business	  practices	  
In	  practice,	  businesses	  have	  reduced	  their	  overall	  financial	  activities,	  which	  affect	  their	  CSR	  in	  order	  
to	  regain	  financial	  stability	  (Jakob	  2012,	  Kemper	  and	  Martin	  2010,	  Karaibrahimoglu	  2010,	  Mia	  2011).	  
Jakob	  finds	  “that	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  had	  a	  clear	  impact	  on	  CSR	  initiatives	  in	  many	  companies	  
because	   of	   the	   exceptional	   pressure	   that	   they	   had	   to	   face	   in	   order	   to	   survive	   and	   with	   massive	  
layoffs	  and	  expenditure	  cuts	  on	  community	   involvement	  programs	  being	  the	  most	  obvious	  outcomes	  
of	   the	   crisis.”	   (Jakob	   2012,	   p.	   259).	   However,	   not	   all	   CSR-­‐initiatives	   seemed	   doomed	   in	   her	  
investigation;	   some	   CSR-­‐issues	   gained	   more	   depth	   after	   the	   crisis,	   for	   instance	   organizational	  
governance	  such	  as	  code	  of	  business	  conducts	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  environmental	  
policies	   and	   compensation	   policies	   (Jakob	   2012,	   p.	   259,	   272).	   Brammer	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   suggest	   that	  
“even	  as	   individual	   and	   corporate	   ‘greed’,	   ‘misconduct’	   and	   ‘failure’	   have	  been	  argued	   to	  be	  at	   the	  
root	  of	  the	  current	  ﬁnancial	  crisis,	  the	  debate	  in	  the	  media,	  in	  politics	  and	  wider	  society	  has	  time	  and	  
again	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘system’	  which	  invited—or	  at	   least	  tolerated—the	  practices	  responsible	  for	  the	  
crisis”	   (Brammer	   et	   al	   2012,	   p.	   22	   cf.	   Campbell	   2011).	   However,	   the	   decline	   of	   CSR	   activities	   has	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been	  shown	  as	  a	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  when	  Karaibrahimoglu	  found	  among	  100	  Fortune	  
500	  listed	  companies	  that	  “there	  is	  significant	  drop	  in	  numbers	  and	  extent	  of	  CSR	  projects	  in	  times	  of	  
financial	  crisis”	  (Karaibrahimoglu	  2010,	  p.	  382).	  	  
The	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   have	   inflicted	   economies	   worldwide	   and	   created	   a	   global	   recession	  
(Obstfeld	   and	   Rogoff	   2009).	   Governmental	   spending	   has	   been	   tightened,	   and	   some	   countries	  
especially	   in	   South	   Europe	   are	   now	   facing	   a	   tremendously	   challenge	   to	   mitigate	   bankruptcy	   and	  
exclusion	   of	   the	   EURO-­‐collaboration	   eventually	   (Marsh	   2011).	   In	   Greece,	   for	   instance,	   government	  
cutbacks,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	  requirements	   for	   the	  extensive	   loans	   that	   the	  state	  has	   received	  
by	   the	   European	   Union,	   result	   in	   hospital	   mergers,	   reduced	   patient	   service,	   layoffs	   or	   pay-­‐cut	   for	  
staff	  (Kalafati	  2012).	  	  
In	   time	   of	   crisis	   economic	   spending	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   reduced;	   unfortunately,	   however,	   it	  
severely	   affects	   businesses	   engagement	   and	   investment	   in	   CSR.	   Academics	   now	   talk	   about	  
consequences	   of	   corporate	   irresponsibility	   and	   linking	   it	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	   and	   the	   current	  
recession	  (Visser	  2008,	  D’Anselmi	  2012,	  Herzig	  and	  Moon	  forthcoming).	  Seemingly	  some	  companies	  
had	   prior	   to	   the	   crisis	   cut	   the	   two	   tops	   of	   Caroll’s	   Pyramid	   (1991)	   of	   CSR;	   the	   ‘philanthropic’	   and	  
‘ethical’	   part	   of	   CSR.	   However,	   the	   literature	   also	   reveals	   that	   corporate	   irresponsibility	   is	   not	  
necessarily	   the	   general	   pattern	   of	   corporate	   behaviour	   even	   facing	   the	   recession:	   Besides	   the	  
already	   known	   irresponsibility	   of	   the	   banking	   and	   financial	   institutions,	   businesses	   as	   well	   as	  
governments	  are	  adopting	  new	  strategies	   for	  both	  a	  more	  sustainable	  economy	  as	  well	  as	   strategic	  
CSR	   to	   sustain	   growth	   (Gianarakis	   and	   Theotokas	   2011,	   Herzig	   and	  Moon	   forthcoming).	   Gianarakis	  
and	  Theotokas	  found	  in	  a	  study	  of	  112	  companies	  implementing	  GRI	  reporting	  guidelines	  from	  2007	  
–	  2010	  increased	  CSR	  performance	  before	  and	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  except	  for	  the	  period	  2009-­‐
	   24	  
2010.	   They	   conclude	   that	   ”the	   financial	   crisis	   has	   prompted	   companies	   to	   move	   away	   from	   the	  
socially	   responsible	  behavior	  as	   it	  costs	  a	   lot	   to	  satisfy	  a	  stakeholder’	  expectations”	   (Gianarakis	  and	  
Theotokas	  2011,	  p.	  6).	  
However,	   history	   shows	   us	   that	   the	   strategy	   to	   stall	   investments	   in	   CSR	   in	   times	   of	   financial	   crises	  
and	   following	   recessions	   might	   be	   both	   a	   fortune	   and	   a	   backlash.	   When	   businesses	   as	   well	   as	  
governments	   face	   financial	   crises,	   its	   first	   and	   foremost	   job	   is	   to	   create	   financial	   stability	   and	  
thereafter	   growth	   (Taylor	   2009).	   However,	   the	   instrument	   used	   for	   this	   purpose	   in	   both	  
governments	   and	   businesses	   has	   yet	   reinforced	   the	   downward	   spiral	   of	   the	   recession	   in	  multitude	  
layoffs,	   cuts	   in	   expenditure,	   which	   amplifies	   the	   withhold	   of	   consumerism	   in	   general.	   How	   do	   we	  
stimulate	   financial	   growth	   with	   lay-­‐offs,	   customers’	   lack	   of	   payment	   capacity	   for	   goods	   and	  
decreased	   public	   and	   private	   investments?	   Governments	   and	   businesses	   are	   striving	   for	   creating	  
more	   jobs.	   Especially	   governments	   of	   rich	   nations	   are	   redirecting	   multiple	   funds	   to	   rescue	   their	  
markets	   and	   businesses	   to	   enhance	   consumerism,	   tax-­‐income,	   and	   eventually	   create	   growth	   and	  
financial	  stability	   for	  businesses	  and	  governments	   (Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  2009).	  This	   is	   the	   ideal	   that	  
most	  politicians	  are	  discussing	  and	  striving	  for,	  however,	   in	  many	  cases	  not	  stimulating	  (Herkenhoff	  
and	  Ohanian	  2009,	  Altman	  2012).	  	  
Other	  businesses,	  however,	  seems	  actually	  to	  strengthen	  strategic	  CSR	  during	  the	  current	  recession	  
in	  order	  to	  stabilize	  its	  financial	  turnover	  and	  recover	  from	  the	  fiscal	  failures	  and	  market	  collapse	  in	  
2008.	   Kemper	   and	  Martin	   states	   that	  “instrumental	   CSR,	   in	  which	   firms	  would	  make	   financial	   gains	  
simply	   by	   doing	   good,	   may	   have	   sustained	   the	   greatest	   image	   of	   all	   CSR	   theories.	   This	   is	   in	   part	  
because	   there	   are	   very	   few	   rewards	   for	   any	   firms	   in	   this	   climate,	   and	   the	   proportion	   of	   profits	  
attributable	   to	   benevolent	   deeds	   is	   yet	   smaller”	   (Kemper	   and	   Martin	   2010,	   p.	   236).	   Porter	   and	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Kramer’s	   ideas	  of	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  as	  well	  as	  philanthropy	  may	  not	  be	  useful	   in	  a	  recession,	  
Kemper	   and	  Martin	   claim.	  However,	   this	   does	  not	  prevent	   that	  business	   leaders	  do	  and	  hope	   for	   a	  
comeback	  of	  strategic	  CSR:	  Using	  strategic	  CSR	  may	  now	  enhance	  trust	  and	  reliability	  and	   indirectly	  
pose	  a	  financial	  stability	  that	  businesses	  crave	  (Thomé	  2009,	  Gianarakis	  and	  Theotokas	  2011).	  	  
CSR	  in	  financial	  business	  practices	  
The	  financial	  sector	  was	  in	  relation	  to	  sustainability	  and	  environmental	  impacts	  traditionally	  seen	  as	  
a	  non-­‐polluting	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐impacting	  sector	  (Herzig	  and	  Moon	  2012).	  However,	  even	  though	  
some	  banks	  began	   to	  display	   their	   ‘indirect	   risks’	   (Viganò	  and	  Nicolai	   2006),	   the	   financial	   crisis	  has	  
shown	   that	   the	   financial	   sector	   did	   not	   pursue	   their	   business	   activities	   in	   ethically	   right	   ways	  
anyhow,	  which	  made	  academia,	  practitioners	   and	  governments	   turn	   the	   critical	   lenses	   towards	   the	  
overall	   financial	   scandals	   and	   global	   impact	   on	   employment	   and	   impoverishment.	   Some	   claim	   that	  
this	   is	   now	   seen	   as	   even	   worse	   than	   diverse	   ecological	   catastrophes	   due	   to	   its	   massive	   scale	   of	  
global	  impact	  (Kallis	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  
While	  the	  system	  of	  complexity	  was	  spun	  out	  in	  the	  world	  wide	  net	  of	  the	  financial	  market	  of	  trade,	  
it	   was	   easy	   to	   blame	   everyone	   else	   and	   especially	   those	   who	   went	   bankrupt,	   which	   is	   a	   typical	  
reaction	   after	   a	   financial	  meltdown	   (Galbraith	   1994).	  Governments	  worldwide	   reacted	   towards	   the	  
crisis	   in	   very	   different	  ways	   according	   to	   their	   economic	   capabilities.	   Nations	   and	   Federations	   lost	  
their	   confidence	   in	   this	   sector	   and	   reinforced	   regulations	   alongside	  provisions	  of	   bank-­‐packages	   to	  
stabilize	   the	   financial	   sector	   and	   the	   economy	   of	   their	   country.	   Today	   many	   former	   bank	   and	  
investment	   executives	   are	   placed	   in	   high	   positions	   as	   consultants	   and	   regulators	   of	   their	   ‘own’	  
sector,	   which	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   still	   widely	   distrust	   of	   the	   entire	   sector	   even	   after	   some	  
governments	  have	  tried	  to	  save	  the	  loans	  of	  the	  people	  at	  the	  dispense	  of	  high-­‐risk	  loans,	  that	  have	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set	   millions	   of	   people	   on	   the	   street	   living	   a	   miserable	   life	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis.	  
(See	  Hellwig	  2008	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  mortgage	  crisis).	  Corporate	  social	  
responsibility	  has	  not	  been	  an	  instrument	  that	  governments	  promoted	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  stabilization	  
of	   the	   financial	   sector;	   regulation,	   federal	   guaranteed	   economic	   support	   with	   strict	   demands	  
towards	   nations	   on	   the	   verge	  of	   financial	   collapse	   is	   todays	   continuing	  breaking	  news	   especially	   in	  
the	  EU	  (e.g.	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Greece,	  Cyprus	  and	  other	  Mediterranean	  EU	  countries).	  
Disputes	   of	   governmental	   interference	   and	   regulation	   was	   perceived	   as	   ‘bad	   rhetoric’	   before	   the	  
crisis,	   however,	   now	   scholars	   have	   begun	   to	   praise	   this	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   solve	   the	   preceding	  
irresponsibility	  of	  the	  financial	  business	  sector	  (e.g.	  Crawford	  and	  Williams	  2010,	  Karnani	  2011a+b):	  
“When	   the	   pursuit	   of	   private	   profits	   by	   firms	   leads	   to	   a	   reduction	   in	   public	   welfare,	   the	   ultimate	  
solution,	   of	   course,	   is	   government	   regulation”,	   says	   Karnani	   (2011b,	   p.	   79)	   and	  dismisses	   voluntary	  
or	   self-­‐regulating	   CSR	   for	   businesses	   and	   suggests	   a	   government	   regulated	   CSR	   that	   is	   binding,	  
coercive	   and	   enforced.	   Others	   plead	   for	   at	   least	   a	   re-­‐definition	   of	   which	   social	   responsibilities	  
businesses	  now	  are	  to	  take	  (O’Toole	  and	  Vogel	  2011,	  Hanson	  2011,	  Karnani	  2011b).	  
Has	  Corporate	  Social	  Performance	  Become	  Corporate	  Social	  “Potemkinity”?	  
The	  myth	  of	  the	  Russian	  minister	  Grigory	  Potemkin,	  who	  ordered	  peasants	  to	  spruce	  up	  the	  riverfront	  of	  the	  
Dnieper	   River	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   Empress'	   Catherine	   II	   visit	   to	   Crimea	   in	   1787,	   is	   called	   the	  
”Potemkin	  Villages”	  (Montefiore	  2005).	  This	  myth	   is	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  word	  ‘Potemkinity’	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  
the	  corporate	  deficits	  in	  corporate	  social	  performance	  and	  their	  consequent	  ‘disguise’	  of	  it,	  which	  the	  academic	  
literature	   has	   amplified	   after	   the	   financial	   crisis.	   The	   fake	   backdrops	   of	   corporate	   ‘promises’	   of	   being	   both	  
financially	  and	  socially	  responsible	  have	  been	  scrutinized	  by	  several	  researchers	  and	  after	  the	  detonation	  of	  the	  
explosive	   crisis.	   Preuss	   (2010)	   found	   that	   several	   estimated	  US-­‐based	  multinational	   companies	   such	   as	   IBM,	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Exxon	  Mobil	  and	  Goldman	  Sachs	  claim	  altruistic	  societal	  purposes	  on	  various	  medias	  while	  hiding	  their	  profits	  
in	  Offshore	  Finance	  Centers	   (OFC)	  or	   ‘Tax	  Havens’	  such	  as	   the	  Cayman	  or	  Bermuda	   Islands	   for	   tax-­‐avoidance	  
estimated	   to	   US$	   11.5	   trillion	   (Hampton	   and	   Christensen	   2007,	   cited	   in	   Preuss,	   2010,	   p.	   366).	   Spitzeck	   and	  
Hansen	  (2010)	  found	  ‘evidence’	  from	  companies	  rhetoric	  claims	  in	  reports	  of	  vivid	  ‘stakeholder	  engagement’	  of	  
corporate	   practices	   from	   customer	   integration	   in	   product	   innovation,	   stakeholder	   dialogues	   in	   operation	  
management	  and	  disclosures	  of	  key	  performance	  indexes.	  However,	  the	  drawback	  of	  their	  investigation	  based	  
on	  the	  ‘truth’	  of	  corporate	  report	  ‘propaganda’,	  these	  stakeholders	  may	  be	  part	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  ‘hearing’,	  which	  
in	  close	  observation	  studies	  rarely	  ends	  up	  in	  ends	  of	  decisional	  influence	  (Lauesen,	  forthcoming).	  The	  answer	  
to	  this	  potential	  ‘disguise’	  of	  the	  stakeholder	  engagement	  of	  corporate	  practices	  can	  perhaps	  be	  explained	  by	  
Minoja	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  suggestions	  that	  the	  more	  stakeholders	  engage	  with	  the	  managerial	  core	  of	  the	  company,	  
the	   less	   stimuli	   to	   innovation	   and	   change	   is	   seen	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   criticism	   inherited	   in	   this	   managerial	  
support.	  That	  managers	  of	  corporations	  choose	  to	  display	  their	  ‘positive’	  stakeholder	  relationship	  and	  not	  the	  
‘conflicts’	  in	  corporate	  reports	  testifies	  that	  ‘stakeholder	  engagement’	  may	  be	  wisely	  ‘selected’	  by	  managers	  in	  
order	   to	  produce	   ‘nice	  stories’	   to	  the	  public	  and	  stabilize	   the	  managerial	  power	  over	   the	  company	   (Lauesen,	  
forthcoming).	  	  
Research	  in	  corporate	  social	  performance	  (CSP)	  replicate	  this	  ‘disguise’,	  for	  instance	  when	  companies	  claim	  to	  
use	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  Principles	  and	  never	  use	  them	  in	  actual	  practice	  (Arevalo	  and	  Aravind	  2010),	  where	  
‘performance’	  becomes	  an	  act	  of	  ‘Potemkinity’.	  Arevalo	  and	  Aravind	  (2010)	  provide	  an	  explanation	  due	  to	  their	  
survey	   analysis	   of	   271	   different	   organizations	   ranging	   from	   63	   companies,	   40	   NGOs,	   112	   SMEs,	   2	   city	  
organizations,	   20	   business	   associations,	   31	   academics,	   1	   CSR	   organization	   and	   2	   foundations:	   The	   more	  
companies	   actually	   enact	  CSR	   into	   their	   policies,	   programmes,	  performances	   and	  goals,	   the	  more	  negatively	  
affected	  they	  were	  by	  the	  economic	  crisis	  (Arevalo	  and	  Aravind	  2010,	  p.	  415).	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  in	  times	  
of	  economic	  crisis,	  companies	  should	  keep	  clear	  of	  engaging	  in	  any	  perspective	  of	  CSR	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	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economic	  survival?	  This,	  albeit,	   is	  not	  the	  conclusion	  Arevalo	  and	  Aravind	  provides,	  since	  their	  second	  finding	  
suggests	  that	  companies	  that	  was	  proactively	  engaging	  in	  CSR	  –	  in	  other	  words:	  ‘processing’	  CSR	  –	  was	  found	  to	  
be	   less	   affected	  by	   the	   economic	   crisis.	   This	   finding	  made	   the	   authors	   conclude	   that	   continuing	   engaging	   in	  
enacting	  CSR	  into	  CSP	  provides	  a	  better	  ground	  for	  coping	  with	  the	  financial	  crisis	  (Arevalo	  and	  Aravind	  2010,	  p.	  
417).	  However,	  this	  rather	  illogical	  correlation	  does	  not	  explain	  which	  other	  spurious	  variables	  can	  be	  inherited	  
in	  their	   findings	  of	   the	  quantitative	  analysis,	  which	  clearly	  suggest	   that	  corporations	  with	  a	  presumably	  good	  
CSP	  are	  hit	  harder	   than	   corporations	   that	  are	   ‘developing’	  CSP	  and	  not	   conducting	  CSP	  at	   the	   time	  being.	   It	  
replicates	  Vissers’	  (2010a)	  suggestions	  that	  one	  cannot	  assume	  a	  financial	  business-­‐case	  out	  of	  good	  CSP	  on	  a	  
short-­‐term	   basis;	   we	   need	   to	   know	   how	   companies	   in	   a	   longitudinal	   and	   historically	   based	   study	   of	   how	  
companies	   survive	   economic	   fluctuations	   (multiple	   economic	   crises);	   do	   they	   manage	   better	   if	   they	   had	  
invested	  in	  good	  CSP	  rather	  than	  those,	  who	  had	  not	  sticking	  to	  purely	  corporate	  financial	  performance?	  With	  
such	  a	   study	  we	   could	  make	  grounded	   claims	   if	   CSP	   in	   fact	  did	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	   long-­‐term	   financial	  
stabilization	  or	  if	  ‘good	  performance’	  is	  a	  disguise	  of	  ‘Potemkinity’	  in	  order	  to	  hide	  the	  real	  effects	  of	  corporate	  
behaviour.	  	  	  
Has	  CSR	  changed	  over	  the	  financial	  crisis?	  
The	   research	   question	   of	   this	   paper	   was:	   “What	   has	   happened	   to	   CSR	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
financial	   crisis	   in	   comparison	   to	   before?”	   The	   literature	   review	   within	   this	   paper	   shows	   that	   the	  
discourses	  of	  CSR	  in	  theory	  in	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐crisis	  theoretical	  models	  have	  changed	  relatively	  little.	  	  
The	   emphasis,	   which	   represented	   theoretical	   ideas	   of	   CSR	   before	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   was	  multiple	  
stakeholder	   relationships,	   transparency	   (and	   honesty)	   in	   disclosure,	   ethical	   values	   (human	   rights,	  
environmental	  protection,	  and	  sustainability)	  and	  strategizing	  businesses	  in	  order	  to	  be	  competitive	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while	  social	  responsible	  (meaning	  that	  profitmaking	  is	  acceptable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  above	  is	  preserved).	  
The	  CSR	  concepts	  that	  have	  emerged	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  have	  showed	  a	  direction	  where8:	  
•	   The	   ‘stakeholder-­‐approach’	   has	   grown	   and	  moved	   from	   an	   outside-­‐in	   (responsive)	   to	   a	  more	  
inside-­‐out	   (pro-­‐active)	   view	   suggesting	   an	   engagement	   with	   multiple	   stakeholders	   (including	  
the	   ‘unknown	   stakeholders	   (D’Anselmi	   2012))	   looking	   at	   what	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   company	   is	  
and	   how	  negative	   impact	   can	   be	   changed	   in	   an	   implemental	  way	   instead	   of	   philanthropically	  
serving	   the	  stakeholders	  and	   the	  continuation	  of	  business	  practices,	  which	   is	   interpreted	   into	  
CSR	  as	  it	  is	  (Visser	  2010a,	  O’Toole	  and	  Vogel	  2011,	  D’Anselmi	  2012).	  
•	   ‘Philanthropy’	   has	   been	   de-­‐emphasized	   as	   it	   was	   by	   corporations	   misused	   for	   “window-­‐
dressing”	  as	  a	  cover	  up	  for	  real	  damages;	  however	   it	   is	  still	  considered	  a	  part	  of	  “doing	  good”	  
especially	   in	   terms	   of	   financing	   growing	   markets	   for	   social	   entrepreneurs	   (Mayoux	   2001,	  
Sapovadia	  2006,	  Hockerts	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Aras	  and	  Crowther	  2010,	  Visser	  2010a),	  which	  has	  taken	  
more	  or	  less	  over	  the	  businesses	  sole	  focus	  on	  charity	  and	  sponsorship.	  
•	   ‘Sustainability’	   has	   grown	   into	   framing	   not	   only	   environmental	   issues,	   but	   also	   social	   and	  
especially	   financial	   issues	   (Aras	   and	   Crowther	   2008,	   2009,	   2010,	   Visser	   2010a),	   since	   all	   new	  
CSR-­‐models	  does	  not	  blindly	  consider	  profit	  as	  only	  “bad”;	  in	  a	  conscious	  and	  sustainable	  way,	  
profitmaking	   still	   is	   the	   livelihood	   for	  businesses,	  albeit	   the	   focus	  has	   shifted	   towards	  a	  more	  
holistic	  emphasize	  of	  the	  business	  in	  society.	  
The	   answer	   to	   the	   research	   question	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   CSR	   has	   not	   changed;	   it	   has	   been	  
strengthened,	   but	   not	   renewed,	   which	   is	   seen	   in	   D’Anselmi’s	   introduction	   of	   the	   concern	   for	   the	  
‘unknown	  stakeholder’	  as	  a	  clearer	  articulation	  of	  what	  former	  CSR-­‐models	  already	  had	  emphasized	  
(e.g.	   Carroll	   1991,	   Wood	   and	   Jones	   1995,	   McWilliams	   and	   Siegel	   2001,	   Garriga	   and	   Melé	   2004,	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Freeman	   and	  Velamuri	   2008).	   The	   de-­‐emphasis	   of	   philanthropy	   happened	   already	   before	   the	   crisis	  
(Schwarz	   and	   Carroll	   2003),	   however,	   have	   not	   prevented	   businesses	   to	   continue	   juxtaposing	  
philanthropic	   sponsoring	   with	   CSR	   (own	   publication).	   The	   ‘sustainability’-­‐turn	   was	   also	   prominent	  
before	   the	   crisis	   (Lovelock	   1979,	   Brundtland	   1987)	   and	   had	   included	   not	   only	   environmental	  
concerns	  but	  also	  financial	  concerns	  (Aras	  and	  Crowther	  2008,	  2009,	  2010).	  
This	   is	   surprising	   due	   to	   the	   reverse	   findings	   of	   the	   discourses	   of	   CSR	   in	   practice,	   which	   have	  
changed	   dramatically	   due	   to	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis.	  Wording	   of	   ‘irresponsibility’,	  
‘greed’,	   ‘habitual	   lying’,	   and	   demands	   of	   ‘governmental	   interference’	   have	   initiated	   a	   new	   tone	   of	  
intolerance	   both	   towards	   the	   financial	   sector	   as	   an	   institution	   as	   well	   as	   towards	   the	   business	  
sector	   in	   general	   in	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   debate.	   This	   ‘anger’	   is	   not	   surprising	   according	   to	   the	   now	  
deceased	  economist	  John	  Kenneth	  Galbraith	  (1994,	  commenting	  on	  the	  financial	  crises	  of	  the	  1980s	  
and	   before)	   as	   it	   is	   a	   ‘normal’	   reaction	   to	   a	   financial	   crisis.	   I	   will	   allow	   the	   well-­‐known	   extended	  
quote	  from	  Galbraith	  for	  a	  reminder	  of	  its	  repercussion	  in	  these	  very	  days:	  	  
“This,	   invariably,	   will	   be	   a	   time	   of	   anger	   and	   recrimination	   and	   also	   of	   profoundly	   unsubtle	  
introspection.	   The	   anger	   will	   fix	   upon	   the	   individuals	   who	   were	   previously	   most	   admired	   for	   their	  
financial	  imagination	  and	  acuity...	  and	  their	  incarceration	  will	  be	  viewed	  with	  righteous	  satisfaction.	  
There	   will	   also	   be	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   previously	   much-­‐praised	   financial	   instruments	   and	   practices	   –	  
paper	   money;	   implausible	   securities	   issues;	   insider	   trading;	   market	   rigging;	   ...	   program	   and	   index	  
trading	   –	   that	   have	   facilitated	   and	   financed	   the	   speculation.	   There	   will	   be	   talk	   of	   regulation	   and	  
reform.	  What	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  is	  the	  speculation	  itself	  or	  the	  aberrant	  optimism	  that	   lay	  behind	  
it”	  (Galbraith,	  1994,	  location	  281	  –	  288,	  Kindle	  edition)	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Taking	  Galbraith’s	  recommendations	  seriously	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  some	  crucial	  dimensions	  in	  order	  
to	   meet	   objectives	   of	   transparency	   especially	   of	   the	   ‘products’	   of	   the	   financial	   sector	   in	   order	   to	  
mitigate	   future	   speculative	   periods	   and	   enter	   the	   same	   fallacy	   as	   men	   has	   done	   throughout	  
centuries	  with	  financial	  crises	  (Reinhart	  and	  Rogoff	  2009).	  
Suggestions	  to	  future	  CSR-­‐models	  to	  be	  developed:	  The	  Four-­‐E-­‐principle	  
The	   financial	   sector	   both	   engineered	   and	   created	   the	   result	   of	   a	   global	   recession	   due	   to	   an	  
unhealthy	   financial	  market	   system	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   financial	   sector	  with	   a	   derived	   critique	   of	  
governments’	   lack	  of	  proper	  regulation.	  History	  has	  revealed	  that	  some	  in	  the	  business	  already	  was	  
aware	   of	   these	   risks	   (e.g.	   JP	  Morgan),	   but	   failed	   to	   articulate	   them	   for	  motives	  we	   can	   only	   guess	  
about:	   Preservation	   of	   their	   own	   businesses?	   The	   spawning	   question	   is	   whether	   the	   ideas	   behind	  
CSR	   can	   provide	   any	   help	   in	   healing	   a	   sick	   (financial)	   system	   or	   if	   governmental	   regulation	   should	  
take	   full	   responsibility	   in	   regulating	   this	   sector?	   Is	   it	   possible	   to	   make	   CSR	   comprehend	   financial	  
products	   that	   are	   so	   complicated	   that	   each	   time	   they	   are	   traded	   (maybe	   daily)	   they	   become	  more	  
spurious	   to	   trace	  with	   a	   diminishing	   quality	   and	   opportunities	   for	   greed	   and	  manipulation	   to	   grow	  
even	  higher?	  
The	   future	   of	   CSR	   and	   where	   it	   is	   positioned	   between	   governmental	   regulation	   and	   voluntarism	  
needs	   a	   further	   discussion	   of	   means	   and	   ends	   of	   the	   global	   economy	   and	   CSR	   also	   needs	  
articulation,	  which	  only	  a	  few	  has	  ‘dared’	  to	  address	  (e.g.	  Karnani	  2011a+b)	  
Finally,	   the	   disentanglement	   of	   the	   dialectics	   that	   previously	   has	   existed	   in	   these	   debates	   (e.g.	  
discussions	   of	   the	   ‘separation-­‐thesis’	   in	   Freeman	   and	   Velamuri	   2008,	   Freeman	   2010a+b,	   and	  
‘fact/value-­‐dichotomy’	  in	  Putnam	  2002)	  needs	  to	  be	  re-­‐evaluated.	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To	   prepare	   for	   these	   debates	   new	   CSR	   concepts	   and	  models	   need	   first	   of	   all	   to	   recognize	   that	   the	  
financial	   sector	   is	  not	   living	   in	  a	  vacuum	  (Freeman	  2010b).	  The	   financial	   sector	   is	  an	   ‘industry’	  with	  
tentacles	   reaching	   far	   into	   these	   other	   industries.	   The	   financial	   sector	   has	   complicated	   products	  
which	   social	   effects	   can	   be	   hard	   to	   understand	   for	   others	   than	   financiers.	   This	   should	   not	   exclude	  
this	  sector	  from	  being	  included	  in	  the	  field	  of	  CSR.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  field	  of	  CSR	  needs	  to	  embrace	  
the	   needs	   for	   stakeholders	   to	   have	   comprehensible	   information	   of	   social	   impacts	   of	   the	   financial	  
products	  they	  buy,	  which	  means	  that	  new	  CSR-­‐models	  needs	  to	  expand	  its	  concepts	  to	  a	  vocabulary	  
that	  can	  embrace	  the	  products	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Like	  physical	  products	  can	  
be	   labelled	  with	  a	   ‘declaration’	  of	  what	   it	   consists	  of	   in	  details,	   so	  might	   financial	  products	  be	  able	  
to	   so	   independent	   rating	   companies	   can	   have	   a	   fair	   and	   non-­‐pressured	   chance	   to	   evaluate	   these	  
products	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  trust	  in	  these	  compound	  products.	  	  
Furthermore,	  CSR	  has	   for	   long	  been	  about	   ‘everything	  but	   finance’.	  This	  dialectical	   relationship	  has	  
to	   end	   if	   we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   cope	   with	   future	   financial	   fluctuations	   and	   prolonged	   stabilization	  
attempts	  (Putnam	  2002,	  Freeman	  and	  Velamuri	  2008,	  Freeman	  2010a+b).	  In	  order	  to	  make	  financial	  
‘products’	  and	  their	  consequences	  transparent	  to	  the	  public	  to	  overcome	  the	  barriers	  that	  the	  crisis	  
has	   left	   the	   world	   in;	   its	   effect	   of	   social	   poverty;	   its	   negative	   or	   stalling	   effect	   on	   the	   ecological	  
crises	  and	  various	  sustainability	  issues,	  new	  CSR-­‐models	  should:	  
• Disentangle	  the	  dialectic	  relationship	  between	  economic	  and	  social	  responsibility:	  
o Cut-­‐off	   the	   ‘promise’	   of	   an	   economic,	   profitable	   business	   case	   out	   of	   short-­‐term	  
investments	   in	   CSR	   and	   substitute	   it	   with	   an	   incentive	   of	   ‘consciousness’	   for	   long-­‐
term	  sustainability.	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o Rethink	   the	   semiotic	   meaning	   of	   the	   semantics	   of	   CSR:	   Consider	   if	   the	   ‘C’	   should	  
represent	   ‘capitalism’	   to	   obtain	   a	   more	   holistic	   perspective	   of	   the	   totality	   of	   the	  
market	   agents	   providing	   semiotic	  meaning	   for	   smaller	   companies	   (Freeman	   2010a),	  
NGOs,	   quasi-­‐privatized	   public	   service	   companies,	   public	   administrations,	   and	   even	  
governments?	  
• Align	  financial	  products	  with	  that	  of	  physical	  products:	  
o Allow	   financial	   products	   to	   be	   scrutinized	   to	   investigate	   which	   derived,	   financial	  
impacts	   upon	   society	   these	   products	   have	   in	   a	   comprehensible	   vocabulary	   that	  
stakeholders	  understand.	  
• Refine	  stakeholder	  engagement	  to	  avoid	  performance	  measures	  as	  ‘Potemkinity’:	  
o Reject	   ‘Potemkinity’	   in	   performance	   measures	   of	   corporate	   reports	   and	   urge	   for	  
managers	   to	   allow	   critical	   voices	   (Deetz	   1992)	   as	   a	   part	   of	   their	   corporate	  
transparency	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   positive	   change	   for	   the	   company	   and	   their	  
stakeholders.	  	  
Based	   on	   Schwartz	   and	   Carroll’s	   (2003)	  middle	   core	   of	   their	   Venn-­‐Diagram	   in	   their	   ‘Three-­‐Domain	  
CSR	   model’,	   I	   suggest	   some	   principles	   for	   new	   CSR-­‐models	   called	   the	   Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principles	  
incorporating	  the	  above.	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Figure	  2:	  a	  proposed	  four-­‐'e'-­‐principles	  for	  new	  csr	  concepts	  developments	  
The	  proposed	  Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principles	  of	  future	  CSR	  models	  should	  encapsulate:	  
• Economy:	  Includes	  the	  impacts	  of	  Surplus,	  Debt,	  Production,	  Products	  and	  overall	  Risks:	  	  
o Display	  who	  benefits	  of	  the	  surplus	  and	  how	  much;	  who	  sacrifices	  upon	  the	  debt	  and	  
how	   severely;	   which	   impacts	   of	   processes	   in	   manufacturing,	   dissemination,	  
exchange,	   and	   possession	   of	   the	   products	   are	   there	   upon	   various	   stakeholders;	   and	  
which	   overall	   risks	   there	   are	   of	   all	   the	   above	   processes	   and	   explain	   the	   actions	   the	  
organizations	  takes	  to	  mitigate	  these.	  
• L/Egal:	   Includes	   the	   consequences	   of	   Regulation,	   (Non-­‐)/Compliance,	   (Anti-­‐)	   /Corruption,	  
and	  (Non-­‐)/Equality:	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o Explain	   both	   compliance	   and	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   regulatory	   objectives	   and	   which	  
actions	   are	   taken	   to	  mitigate	   corruption	  and	   risk-­‐evaluations	  of	   risks	  of	   incidents	  of	  
corruption.	  
o Explain	  the	  degree	  of	  diversity	  and	  critical	  measures	  of	  risks	  of	  oppression	  of	  certain	  
stakeholder	  groups.	  	  
• Environment:	   Includes	   the	   impacts	   upon:	   Stakeholders,	   Living	   nature,	   Environment,	   and	  
Cultural	  heritage:	  
o Display	   which	   stakeholders,	   living	   species	   and	   natural	   habitats,	   human	   and	   natural	  
environments	   including	   endangered	   subgroups	   and	   geospatial	   areas	   of	   land,	   water,	  
and	   air	   as	   well	   as	   which	   cultural	   heritages	   are	   impacted	   of	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	  
organization	  and	  explain	  what	  is	  done	  to	  mitigate	  it.	  
o Explain	  why	  certain	  stakeholders	  have	  a	  voice	  and	   impact	  upon	  managerial	  decision-­‐
making	   and	   not	   others,	   and	   explain	   which	   critical	   stakeholder	   opinions	   are	   in-­‐	   and	  
excluded	  by	  the	  management’s	  decisions.	  
• Ethics:	  Includes	  the	  concerns	  for	  People,	  Planet	  and	  Profit:	  
o Explain	   which	   policies	   the	   organization	   has	   to;	   protect	   the	   people	   within	   and	  
external	   to	   the	   organization,	   protect	   the	   planet	   from	   their	   impacts;	   and	   share	   its	  
profit;	  and	  how	  they	  execute	  them.	  
What	   does	   the	   Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principles	   offer	   that	   for	   instance	   the	   UN	   Global	   Compact	   or	   the	   Global	  
Reporting	   Initiative	   does	   not	   offer?	   The	   Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principles	   urges	   the	  managers	   not	   just	   to	   display,	  
but	  also	  to	  reflect	  on	  their	  organization’s	   total	   impact	  upon	  stakeholders	  and	   include	  critical	  voices	  
as	  well	  as	  managerial	  responses.	   It	   includes	  a	  perspective	  upon	  ‘financial	  products’	  and	  phenomena	  
such	   as	   economic	   surplus	   and	   debt	   and	   urges	   the	   managers	   to	   reflect	   upon	   the	   societal	  
	   36	  
consequences	  of	   those.	  Finally	   it	   implicitly	  argues	  that	  critique	  and	  self-­‐critique	   is	  not	  a	  vice;	   it	   is	  a	  
virtue	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   legitimacy	   and	   trustworthiness	   in	   managers	   daring	   to	   avoid	   corporate	  
‘Potemkinity’.	  	  
Social	   responsibility	   is	   about	   creating	   actions	   that	   enhance	   trust	   in	   ‘capitalism’	   and	   it’s	   multiple	  
effects	  upon	  multiple	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  environments	  (Lauesen,	  paper	  #4).	  Trust	  can	  neither	  be	  
established	  by	   regulation	  alone	  nor	  by	   giving	  market	   agents	   full	   discretion.	  CSR	  has	  been	  used	  and	  
misused	   by	   businesses	   to	   gain	   legitimacy.	   Thus,	   new	   concepts	   needs	   to	   delineate	   a	   way	   to	   give	  
social	   responsibility	   of	   all	   kinds	   of	   organizations	   acting	   on	   the	   capitalist	   market	   an	   ideational	  
comeback	  both	   in	   industries,	   the	   financial,	   governmental,	   non-­‐governmental	   and	   the	  public	   sector.	  
To	  admit	  that	  CSR	  is	  more	  about	  the	  entirety	  of	  ‘Capitalism’s	  Social	  Responsibility’	  may	  initiate	  such	  
new	  concepts	  to	  emerge.	  
The	   outcome	   of	   this	   paper	   suggests	   that	   new	   research	   in	   CSR	   should	   facilitate	   a	   revision	   of	   ‘old’	  
CSR-­‐concepts	   in	   order	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   Four-­‐‘E’-­‐Principle	   suggested	   in	   order	   to	   revive	   the	   ideas	  
behind	  CSR	  as	  a	  field	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  or	  in	  conjunction	  with	  governmental	  regulation.	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   enough.	   This	   last	   argument	   has	   come	   true	   after	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   Both	   authors	   continue,	  
however,	   campaigning	   their	   “Big	   Idea”	   in	   Harvard	   Business	   Review,	   January	   2011	   (Porter	   and	   Kramer	   2011)	   although	  
their	  shouts	  still	  receive	  critique	  in	  2013	  (e.g.	  Hart	  2013,	  Paramanand	  2013).	  
6	  (which	  is	  not	  a	  word	  that	  Heal	  uses	  directly)	  
7	  (see	  www.equator-­‐principles.com	  ).	  
8	  Due	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  paper	  the	  field	  of	  ’social	  entrepreneurship’	  is	  left	  out	  of	  this	  review	  albeit	  this	  field	  in	  the	  
recent	  years	  have	  a	  massive	  growth	   in	  both	   recognition	  and	  corresponding	  mindset	   comparable	   to	   the	   literature	  of	  CSR.	  Due	   to	   the	  
emerging	  processing	  of	  conceptualizations	  of	  the	  field,	  which	  is	   lacking	  and	  sought	  to	  take	  place	  in	  the	  future	  (Short	  et	  al.	  2009),	  this	  
field	  is	  thus	  conceptually	  excluded	  here.	  
